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Abstract  
 
Since the launch of the euro, persistent and even rising disparities among Member States have 
made it difficult to implement short-term or structural common economic policies. The article 
gives an overview of euro area disparities in terms of growth and inflation and imbalances, 
mainly unemployment and current accounts. Four explanations are considered: the benefits of 
the single currency for catching-up countries, the weaknesses of the euro area economic 
policy framework; the implementation of non-cooperative domestic policies which have 
induced excessive competition and insufficient coordination and hurt mainly the larger 
economies; the crisis of the European Continental model in a global world. Four strategies are 
discussed: increasing market flexibility; moving towards the knowledge society of the Lisbon 
Agenda; re-nationalising economic policies; introducing a more growth-oriented policy 
framework. 
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1. Introduction  
Before the launch of the euro, the proponents of European economic and monetary Union 
(EMU) thought that the single currency would pave the way for rapid economic convergence 
among Member States. Smaller country specificities would have reduced the need for 
domestic fiscal policies and the conduct of short-tem economic policy could have been 
handed over mostly to the European central bank (ECB). Fiscal binding rules would then have 
been justified. The macroeconomic success of EMU would have helped the convergence of 
industrial and social policies towards a liberal model (more labour market flexibility, more 
product competition, reduction of the role of the State and public sector and less welfare 
spending). In return, the successes of these structural policies would have facilitated the 
coordination of stabilisation policies. 
But there have been persistent and sometimes growing divergences between euro area 
countries in terms of output growth, inflation, unemployment and external balances since 
1999. The single currency tends to impose similar macroeconomic policies in countries in 
different situations and seems to have widened growth disparities among Member States. The 
launch of the single currency made winners (Ireland, Spain, Greece) and losers (Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal). The institutions and the rules set out by the Treaties (the 
ECB, the Stability and Growth Pact) have been unable to tackle these divergences. European 
institutions have tried to introduce structural reforms (through the broad economic policy 
guidelines, BEPGs, the open method of coordination, OMC, or the Lisbon Agenda) but have 
faced national specificities or inertia. Their implementation has been lacking democratic 
legitimacy, lacking support at the domestic level and not always in line with domestic policy 
decisions. 
In most economies and especially in the bigger ones, the introduction of the euro did not 
result in the promised acceleration of output growth. In some countries, the acceleration of 
growth generated hardly sustainable imbalances. Member States have been unable to set out a 
common growth strategy. They have not questioned the ECB’s remit and SGP rules. Euro 
area countries, with the exception of Ireland, are widely homogeneous in terms of high 
taxation rates and Bismarkian social protection systems. However they have been unable or 
unwilling to maintain this specificity at the European level. They have hesitated between two 
strategies: a social-Keynesian one with a strong commitment to maintaining a specific 
European Social Model (ESM) and a proactive industrial policy; a free market strategy, based 
on market deregulation and reform of the ESM through public expenditures cuts and smaller 
role of the State in the economy. European Institutions recommended liberal strategies that 
did not always meet Peoples’ expectations, albeit lacking the democratic legitimacy needed to 
impose such measures. This weakened the European construction. The move towards more 
flexible markets has been questioned (for instance with the non adoption of the Bolkestein 
directive). Some countries were tempted to re-nationalize industrial policy (like in France for 
instance), while most European countries opposed the implementation of European social or 
fiscal policies. This debate takes place at a time when European continental countries 
especially need to adapt to globalisation: should they move towards a liberal or a 
Scandinavian model? Should this choice be made at European or national levels? 
Section 2 provides an overview of disparities in terms of output growth, inflation and 
unemployment in the euro area. The widening of some economic imbalances (current account 
and government deficits, competitiveness) and the persistence of disparities are highlighted. 
Section 3 addresses four reasons for persistent and rising disparities: the benefits of the euro 
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area for catching-up countries, the weaknesses of the euro area economic policy framework; 
the implementation of non-cooperative domestic policies which would have induced 
excessive competition, insufficient coordination and would have been detrimental mainly to 
the larger economies; the crisis of the Continental model in a global world. Section 4 
discusses for strategies aiming at reducing disparities in Europe: increasing market flexibility; 
moving towards the knowledge society of the Lisbon Agenda; re-nationalising economic 
policies at the domestic level or a introducing a more growth-oriented European economic 
policy framework. 
2. Euro area: disparities and lost illusions 
GDP growth was relatively satisfactory in the euro area between 1985 and 1991 (+3.1% per 
year, see table 1). GDP growth decelerated by 1.3 percentage points per year from 1992 to 
1998 due to a bad management of the German reunification and to contractionary fiscal 
policies implemented in the convergence process to meet the Maastricht criteria. The launch 
of the single currency in 1999 did not enable the area to reach a more satisfactory growth. 
Since 1991, GDP has grown less rapidly in the euro area than in the UK or in the US (1.8% 
per year, versus respectively 2.7 and 3.3). 
Since 1999, GDP growth has remained strong in Ireland and has accelerated in two countries 
only: Spain and Greece, although this has led to a rise in current account deficits. Looking at 
average GDP growth rates in 1999-2005 and 1985-1991, the main losers are Germany, Italy, 
Portugal and the Netherlands. Greece and Spain have been converging towards the average 
area in terms of GDP per head (in PPP) while Portugal and Italy have been diverging 
downwards and Ireland upwards: in 14 years (from 1991 to 2005), the GDP per head relative 
to the euro area rose by 65% in Ireland, 18% in Greece, 17% in Spain whereas it declined by 
1.5% in Portugal. Among the largest economies, the GDP per head relative to the euro area 
declined by 7% in Germany and Italy, by 1.5% in France, whereas it rose by 18% in the UK. 
Non euro area EU countries performed better than euro area ones.  
Table 1. GDP Growth rates 
 1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2005 PPP GDP per head 1991 
PPP GDP per 
head  2005 
Euro area 3.1 1.8 1.9 100.0 100.0 
Belgium 2.7 1.8 2.0  108.7 111.1 
Germany 3.5 1.5 1.3  108.9 101.5 
Greece 1.7 1.8 4.3  67.0 78.9 
Spain 3.9 2.3 3.6 79.2 92.8 
France 2.6 1.8 2.2 104.2 102.7 
Ireland 4.0 7.2 6.5  78.8 130.6 
Italy 2.9 1.3 1.2  105.3 97.6 
Netherlands 3.6 2.7 1.7  107.0 117.4 
Austria 3.1 2.2 2.0  113.8 114.8 
Portugal 5.1 2.4 1.6 68.6 67.2 
Finland 1.8 2.5 2.8 97.6 108.7 
Denmark 1.5 2.7 1.9 106.7 116.2 
Sweden 1.9 2.7 2.9 108.2 111.6 
UK 2.6 2.7 2.7 93.6 110.4 
US 2.8 3.6 3.0 131.1 139.7 
Source: European Commission. 
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Many economists consider that euro area growth is low because potential growth is low and 
that disparities in domestic GDP growth rates reflect disparities in domestic potential growth 
(see for instance, Benalal et al. 2006). According to the European Commission and OECD 
estimates, the euro area potential growth rate was 2.0% between 1998 and 2005, hence very 
close to observed growth. From that point of view, if demand had been more robust, the 
outcome would have been higher inflation only. Inflation has remained almost stable in the 
euro area since 1996, which would mean that demand was roughly equal to potential output, 
either by chance or thanks to an appropriate monetary policy. Output could have been risen 
only through structural measures: higher productivity growth (owing to capital accumulation, 
higher R&D or education spending), higher labour supply (through immigration, longer 
working time and lower female and older people inactivity rates), or lower equilibrium 
unemployment rate (through increased labour market flexibility). In our view, output growth 
is not determined by but has an impact on productivity gains, capital accumulation, 
participation rates, equilibrium unemployment rates and even population (through 
immigration). What does ‘potential growth’ mean for countries suffering from mass 
unemployment and low participation rates? When unemployment rates are high, older people 
and female participation rates decrease, either without or with policy; companies have no 
incentive to raise labour productivity. Thus contractionary fiscal policies, high real interest 
rates or low competitiveness may induce low output growth for several years. This will not 
reflect low potential growth that would materialise independently of observed growth. Saying 
that weak past observed growth is due to low trend growth, can be a self-fulfilling prophecy if 
it taken as a basic assumption by economic policy.  
From 1998 to 2005, unemployment rates decreased slightly in the majority of euro area 
countries but rose in Germany, Portugal, and also in the Netherlands and Austria, although 
remaining at a low level (see table 2). Unemployment rates fell rapidly in four countries: 
Ireland and Finland, thanks to robust GDP growth, Italy thanks to low labour productivity 
growth1, Spain thanks to both growth and low labour productivity growth. However, in 2005, 
eight euro area countries remained in a mass unemployment situation. These countries 
account for 90% of the area and they could have tried to introduce policies to support growth 
and employment, especially as inflation was moderate (2.2%) and the current account was in 
balance.  But the priority was instead to implement structural reforms.  
                                                 
1 This is probably partly a statistical artefact resulting from regularisation of foreign workers and reduction of 
labour in the underground economy. 
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Table 2. Unemployment and employment rates 
 Unemployment rate, % Employment rate, %(full time equivalent) 
Labour productivity 
growth rate, % 
 1998 2005 2005 1999-2005 
Euro area 10.1 8.6 59.8 1.0 
Belgium 9.3 8.4 57.1 1.2 
Germany 8.8 9.5 60.4 1.6 
Greece 10.9 9.8 59.2 3.5 
Spain 15.0 9.2 60.9 0.3 
France 11.1 9.5 59.7 1.1 
Ireland 7.5 4.3 64.6 2.8 
Italy 11.3 7.7 55.5 0.4 
Netherlands 3.8 4.7 60.9 1.3 
Austria 4.5 5.2 63.7 1.5 
Portugal 5.1 7.6 65.6 0.8 
Finland 11.4 8.4 65.3 1.5 
Denmark  4.9 4.8 69.4 1.6 
Sweden 8.2 7.8 68.0 1.9 
UK 6.1 4.7 65.4 1.7 
US 4.5 5.1 67.0 2.2 
Source: OECD. 
 
In terms of employment rates, Italy stands clearly below the other euro area countries. Then 
comes Belgium. The other countries can be split into two groups: medium rate countries 
(Germany, Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands) and high rate countries (Ireland, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland and, outside the area, Sweden, Denmark and the UK). High rate 
countries include Scandinavian and liberal countries and also Austria. Medium rate countries 
need to increase their employment rates by almost 10% to reach the UK level (18% for Italy). 
This will be a challenge for economic policies in the years to come, especially in the prospect 
of financing higher pension expenditures. However a crucial issue remains: should demand be 
increased first in order to increase labour demand, hoping that labour supply will follow? 
Structural reforms like the abolition of early retirement or a better control of unemployment 
allowances would be implemented only ex post and only in countries where labour demand is 
clearly above supply. Such a strategy would raise a risk of inflationary pressures. Or should 
countries where unemployment is high start with structural reforms which would raise labour 
supply and employment? Such a strategy would raise a risk of raising unemployment and 
increase poverty among the unemployed.  
Many countries suffering from high unemployment rates have chosen to give company 
incentives to reduce labour productivity growth and to hire unskilled workers (Spain, Italy, 
Belgium and France). Other countries (Germany) tried instead to increase employment 
through competitiveness gains, especially through higher productivity growth in the industry. 
The European Employment strategy and the Lisbon Agenda failed to impose a common 
strategy.  
A good functioning of the monetary union requires avoiding disparities in terms of price 
levels. Different price levels will generate competitiveness differentials and will need to be 
corrected later through output growth differentials. In practice, inflation differentials have 
remained substantial in the euro area (see table 3). Countries running higher inflation also 
enjoyed higher output growth (Spain, Ireland, Greece) or had low initial price levels, due to 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Spain, Greece, Portugal). However Italy and the Netherlands 
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also had relatively high inflation rates. The Dutch economy ran for several years at over-
capacity and several rises in indirect taxes increased inflation. Inflation was in none of these 
countries due to excessive demand levels induced by excessive public deficits. Even when 
accounting for the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which may explain 1 percentage point of 
inflation in Greece and Portugal, 0.6 in Spain, inflation seems to have risen too rapidly in 
these three countries and has led to price competitiveness losses. Inflation has been extremely 
low in Germany, which has prevented other countries from restoring their price 
competitiveness. In 2006, inflation disparities remained large in the euro area: inflation was 
0.9% in the three countries running the lower inflation, and 3.2% in the countries running the 
higher inflation. Wage and price formation processes have not converged yet.  
Another difficulty in a monetary union is that catching-up countries have structurally higher 
output growth and inflation rates than more ‘mature’ countries. Thus it is difficult to run a 
single monetary policy even in the absence of asymmetric shocks. With a single nominal 
interest rate, euro area countries have had different real interest rates corrected from growth 
(see table 3). The single monetary policy was contractionary for Germany and expansionary 
for Ireland, Greece and Spain where companies and households had a strong incentive to 
borrow and invest, which boosted domestic GDP growth and inflation.  
Table 3. Inflation and real interest rates  
 Price level Inflation  
(GDP deflator) 
Real interest rate less GDP growth rate 
 2005 1999-2005 1992-1998 1999-2005 
Euro area 100.0 1.8 2.5 -0.6 
Belgium 101.1 1.7 1.6 -0.6 
Germany 104.9 0.7 1.6 1.1 
Greece 81.4 3.6 6.7 -3.3 
Spain 88.6 3.9 2.1 -4.4 
France 103.8 1.4 2.9 -0.5 
Ireland  116.3 3.9 -3.5 -7.3 
Italy 97.3 2.5 3.9 -0.6 
Netherlands 103.5 2.7 0.9 -1.4 
Austria 101.9 1.5 1.3 -0.4 
Portugal 81.5 3.4 1.6 -1.7 
Finland 109.5 1.2 1.3 -0.9 
Denmark 129.7 2.3 2.5 -0.9 
Sweden 112.1 1.4 1.7 -0.8 
UK 105.5 2.5 3.7 0.3 
US 93.9 2.2 -0.1 -2.4 
Source: European Commission. 
  
The euro area interest rate was 3.1% on average from 1999 to 2005. A Taylor rule based on 
an inflation target of 2%, output gaps as estimated by the OECD, would have suggested 
average interest rates of 1.75% for Germany, 3.05% for France, 3.8% for Italy, 4% for the 
euro area and 8.05% for Spain. However the 2% inflation target may be judged too low. The 
euro area needs higher GDP growth and this may result in transitory inflationary pressures on 
some markets. The OECD potential output estimates are very low: the euro area output gap 
was estimated to be nil in 1999, when the unemployment rate was 9.2% and nil also in 2002, 
when the unemployment rate was 8.3%.  
The ECB is less concerned with GDP growth than the Fed in good as in bad times. Since 
1999, the monetary stance has been clearly more expansionary than suggested by a Taylor 
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rule in the US; more accommodative in the euro area too, although to a smaller extent and 
restrictive in the UK (see table 4).  
Table 4. Taylor rules and effective central banks’ rates 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Euro area 
Taylor based rate 
Actual rate 
 
2.5 
3.1 
 
4.8 
4.5 
 
5.3 
4.3 
 
4.55 
3.3 
 
3.55 
2.3 
 
3.75 
2.1 
 
3.5 
2.2 
 
3.7 
3.1 
UK 
Taylor based rate 
Actual rate 
 
3.2 
5.6 
 
3.05 
6.2 
 
3.45 
5.0 
 
3.3 
4.1 
 
3.4 
3.7 
 
3.5 
4.6 
 
4.0 
4.8 
 
4.05 
5.0 
US 
Taylor based rate 
Actual rate 
 
4.6 
5.4 
 
7.15 
6.5 
 
5.2 
3.8 
 
2.75 
1.8 
 
3.75 
1.2 
 
4.8 
1.6 
 
6.35 
3.5 
 
6.15 
5.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The wage share in GDP decreased both at the euro area level and in eight Member States 
between 1999 and 2005 (see table 5). Real wages increased by a mere 0.35% per year in 
Germany, 0.5% in Austria and Italy, 0.6% in Belgium, while there rose by 1.3% in France, 
1.5% in the Netherlands and 2.5 % in the UK. Increasing company profitability and price 
competitiveness through downwards pressure on wages became a major strategy in several 
countries, like in Germany and Austria. On the one hand, it was the only tool available for 
countries which could neither depreciate their currency nor cut their interest rate nor use fiscal 
policy once the 3% of GDP limit for government deficits had been breached. On the other 
hand, firms could threaten to relocate their production abroad in order not to raise wages. 
Last, fixed exchange rates (at least in the euro area) ensured that the effect of wage 
moderation would not be cancelled by exchange rate appreciation. This strategy helped 
exports but put a drag on private consumption in the countries where it was implemented 
consequently dampening demand in the whole euro area.  
Table 5. Adjusted wage share in GDP, 1998/2005 
 Change in percentage point, 1998-2005 
Euro area -1.5  
Belgium -1.3 
Germany -1.6 
Greece -4.3 
Spain -5.0 
France -0.7 
Ireland  -2.8 
Italy -0.7 
Netherlands 0.5 
Austria -5.8 
Portugal 3.3 
Finland 1.9 
Denmark -1.7 
Sweden 2.0 
UK 3.1 
US -0.9 
Source: European Commission. 
How to deal with economic divergences in EMU? 
 8
In this non-cooperative game, the winners were Germany, Austria and the Netherlands (see 
table 6) which succeeded in supporting domestic GDP growth through a positive contribution 
of net exports (by around 0.5 percentage point of GDP each year). The losers were Spain and 
France (0.7 percentage point of GDP per year).  
Consumption growth was weak in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria from 1999 
to 2005. In some countries (Germany, Austria) housing investment fall abruptly in parallel, 
whereas housing booms developed in Spain and Ireland with the support of low real interest 
rates. In Germany, the weak level of households’ demand was not offset by a rise in company 
investment. Company investments rose rapidly in catching-up countries (Greece, Spain). 
Table 6. GDP and Domestic Demand growth rates, 1999-2005 
%, per year 
 GDP 
Domestic 
demand 
Productive 
investment 
Housing 
investment 
Households’ 
consumption 
Euro Area 1.9 2.0 2.6 1.5 1.9 
Belgium 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.4 1.6 
Germany 1.3 0.8 1.0 -2.7 1.0 
Greece 4.3 4.2 9,1 2.6 3.4 
Spain 3.6 4.3 6.6 7.1 4.0 
France 2.2 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.5 
Ireland  6.5 6.4 0.5 14.2 6.0 
Italy 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.3 1.6 
Netherlands 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.4 
Austria 2.0 1.4 3.7 -3.2 1.6 
Portugal 1.6 1.6 n.a. n.a. 2.3 
Finland 2.8 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.0 
Denmark 1.9 1.8 2.1 5.8 1.5 
Sweden 2.9 2.0 2.8 10.9 2.4 
UK 2.7 3.1 1.8 2.1 3.3 
US 3.0 3.6 3.3 5.4 3.6 
Source: European Commission. 
 
In terms of domestic and external demands, Euro area countries can be divided into 4 groups: 
the ‘winners’ (Ireland, Spain, Greece), where both domestic and external demands are strong; 
the ‘bad guys’ (Germany, Austria, Netherlands), where a weak domestic demand is offset by 
strong export demand gains; the ‘losers’ (Italy, Portugal) suffering from both low domestic 
and external demand; the ‘victims’ (France, Belgium, Finland) where a weak external demand 
partly offsets a satisfactory domestic demand.  
The euro area as a whole won competitiveness from 1996 to 2001 thanks to the fall in the 
euro vis-à-vis the US dollar. A weak euro together with the NTIC bubble accompanied strong 
GDP growth (3% per year from 1997 to 2000) and employment (8.7% in five years). This 
shows that the European economy can grow rapidly if there is a robust demand. The 
competitiveness gains were more than cancelled by appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US 
dollar and Asian currencies from 2001 and 2004. The euro area needs a weaker exchange rate 
in the light of the high level of unemployment. The euro area has been able to have a low 
exchange rate only when domestic demand was strong in the US, because the US then also 
had an interest in a high dollar. But the euro is high vis-à-vis the dollar is always high when 
US domestic demand is relatively weak. The euro area suffers from a less active monetary 
policy than in the US. Last, the euro area suffers from exchange rate policies in Asian 
countries, where exchange rates are kept low to support a fragile GDP growth (Japan), to 
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support exports growth (China, new industrial economies) and to accumulate foreign 
currencies reserves.   
From 1988 to 1999, some European countries had succeeded in depreciating in their currency 
in real terms vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark: Finland, Italy, Spain and outside the future euro 
area, Sweden. Germany, Austria and Portugal joined the euro area at too high exchange rates 
which induced substantial current account deficits. Since 1999, Austria and Germany have 
succeeded in restoring their competitiveness through wage moderation policies. Italy seems to 
be unable to maintain its competitiveness in the absence of exchange rate devaluation. Italy 
and Portugal have been more affected than the average area by the emergence of China.  
Fixed exchange rates and rigid inflation rates induce persistent exchange rates misalignment 
periods. In the euro area countries can no more devalue their currency to restore their 
competitiveness. Wage moderation policies are the only tool left but take a long time to play 
and are painful, since they depressed demand both at home and in the area. Wage moderation 
policies would be all the more difficult to implement in euro area countries that they are 
already implemented in Germany, where domestic inflation is very low which makes it harder 
for partner countries to gain competitiveness against Germany.  
Non coordinated policies have increased imbalances within the euro area: in 2005, a few 
countries ran substantial current account surpluses: the Netherlands (6.6% of GDP) and 
Germany (4.2%), whereas some others ran large deficits: Portugal (-9.3% of GDP), Spain (-
7.4%) and Greece (-7.9%) (see table 7). The 160 billion euro surplus of Germany and the 
Netherlands finances the 145 billion euro deficit of Mediterranean countries. Do these 
divergences in current accounts reflect an equilibrium process (oldest countries’ savings being 
invested in younger and more profitable countries) or a disequilibrium one (European savings 
being spoiled in non-profitable investment, such as housing, in Southern countries)? This 
situation cannot be considered as optimal since real interest rates corrected from output 
growth differ across the area. Deficits can widen because they are not financed by financial 
markets but by transfers within the European banking system and hence can hardly be visible. 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) cover only a small part of these deficits: Portugal receives a 
small amount of net FDI (1 % of GDP in 2005), but net FDIs are negative for Spain (-1.4% of 
GDP) or Greece (-0.4%). National saving rates are very low in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
which is unusual for countries growing at a rapid rate. 
Output growth is strong in Greece, Spain, the UK and in the US too, while both national and 
households saving rates are very low. On the contrary, Belgium, Germany, Austria and 
France suffer from too high saving rates. Low saving rates seem necessary to have high GDP 
growth and low public debt. Virtue is dangerous in Europe, since the weakness of domestic 
demand resulting from a high savings ratio cannot be offset by low interest rates or substantial 
government deficits. 
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Table 7. External positions  
Competitiveness* Current account balance, % of GDP 
National  
savings rate  
Households 
net savings 
ratio  
1998 2005 1998 2005 2005 2005 
Euro Area 108 100 0.8 0.0 20.6 na 
Belgium 104 96 5.2 2.5 23.7 6.2 
Germany 101 109 -0.8 4.2 22.1 10.7 
Greece 89 77 -3.0 -7.9 15.8 n.a. 
Spain 108 95 -1.2 -7.4 16.9 5.4 
France 101 100 2.6 -1.7 19.9 11.6 
Ireland  92 107 0.8 -2.6 25.5 n.a. 
Italy 114 95 -3.0 -1.1 20.5 9.5 
Netherlands 105 96 3.2 6.6 24.0 5.7 
Austria 95 114 -3.1 1.2 22.7 9.5 
Portugal 97 73 -7.1 -9.3 15.7 4.9 
Finland 127 122 5.6 5.2 19.0 n.a. 
Denmark 101 89 -0.9 2.9 23.8 -5.8 
Sweden 110 132 3.9 6.0 22.9 n.a. 
UK 92 86 -0.4 -2.2 15.4 0.0 
US 94 108 -2.4 -6.4 14.5 -0.4 
* 1988 = 100; on the basis of unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector. A rise means competitiveness gains.   
Source: OECD. 
 
In the last recession (2000-2004), GDP growth was hardly supported by fiscal policies in the 
euro area: the fiscal impulse was 1.2 percentage point of GDP only, as compared to 5.6 in the 
UK and 6 in the US (see table 8). Except for Greece and Finland, euro area countries 
implemented close to neutral fiscal policies. These years of low growth and rising fiscal 
deficits generated tensions between European authorities and national governments. In 2005, 
5 euro area countries and 7 non euro area countries were under an excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) (Mathieu/Sterdyniak 2006). The SGP was a corset for fiscal policies in these years. 
The objective of bringing debts to below 60% of GDP was not fulfilled: government debts 
still stand at around 100% of GDP while the French and German debts have risen above 60% 
of GDP.  
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Table 8. Fiscal Policies 
Percentage of GDP Government balance, 2005 
Fiscal impulse* 
2000/2004 
Gross public 
debt, Maastricht 
definition, 2005 
Net public debt 
Euro Area -2.4 1.2 71 55 
Belgium 0.0 0.6 93 86 
Germany -3.2 1.1 68 58 
Greece -5.1 7.1 109 96 
Spain 1.1 -0.4 43 31 
France -2.9 1.5 67 44 
Ireland  1.1 2.8 28 10 
Italy -4.3 2.4 106 99 
Netherlands -0.3 0.0 53 38 
Austria 1.3 -2.7 63 42 
Portugal -6.0 1.3 64 45 
Finland 2.5 4.9 41 -60 
Denmark 4.6 -0.4 36 7 
Sweden 2.8 3.1 50 -12 
UK -3.4 5.6 44 41 
US -3.7 6.0 65 46 
*The Fiscal impulse is the change in the primary cyclically adjusted government balance. A positive figure 
reflects an expansionary policy. 
Source: OECD. 
 
However public finances were more sustainable in the euro area than in the US, the UK or 
Japan in 2006 (see table 9). Public finances have deteriorated in the euro area because of a 
persistent negative output gap. Fiscal consolidation is not urgently needed in euro area 
economies. European Institutions put a too strong weight on public deficits relative to growth 
issues.  
Table 9. Public finance sustainability in 2006 
Percentage of GDP Structural balance Output gap Limit for gov. balance*
US -3.7 0.6 -3.0/-3.3 
Japan -5.3 0.5 -1.0/-3.0 
Germany -2.1 -1.7 -1.7/-2.7 
France -2.1 -1.7 -1.8/-2.8 
Italy -3.6 -1.3 -1.9/-4.3 
Portugal -2.8 -4.1 -2.3/-4.0 
Greece -3.5 1.2 -3.3/-7.0 
UK -3.1 -0.8 -2.0/-2.5 
Note: The limit for the government balance is calculated under two alternative assumptions: a strict assumption 
where the level of desired debt is either the current level or 50% of GDP (for countries where debts exceed this 
limit); a more favourable assumption where the level of desired debt corresponds to the observed level or 50% of 
GDP (where debts are below this limit). Moreover, the structural balance is considered to contain discretionary 
measures for an amount of GDP corresponding to 25% of the output gap, if the latter is negative. Public finances 
are unsustainable if the public deficit is higher than the limit, even under the favourable calculation. This is the 
case for countries in italics.  
Source: OECD, own calculations. 
 
The majority of euro area countries, except Spain and Ireland, have high public expenditure 
levels, standing at above 50% of GDP. At the euro area level, the share of primary structural 
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public spending was the same in 1990 and 2006. The share has risen in several countries: 
Portugal (by 10 percentage points), Belgium (3.5) and France (2.5) and outside the euro area, 
the UK (3 percentage points). The share has fallen in other countries: the Netherlands (by 5 
percentage points), Spain (4), Ireland (2.5), and also in Sweden (5). The European 
Commission has failed to impulse public expenditures cuts in the European Union and 
countries have hardly converged. High levels of public expenditure require high levels of 
taxation. But, as the Scandinavian example shows, high tax to GDP ratios are consistent with 
high employment rates (see chart 1).  
Chart 1: Employment rates and taxation rates 
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Source: OECD.  
 
The expression ‘European Social Model’ is generally used to refer to an original economic 
and social framework in EU countries but its content of this concept is vague. It is more a 
political objective – defining a minimum set of common characteristics among Member States 
that the European construction would agree to defend. But European social protection systems 
differ in many respects. They are generally characterised according to four systems (Esping-
Anderson 1990), even if this classification raises many issues:  
- The Scandinavian model, with a very high level of social expenditure based on 
citizenship, funded through taxation, a high female employment rate, low social 
inequalities and a strong cooperation between social partners (Finland, Netherlands and 
also Denmark and Sweden). 
- The Continental model, with a high level of social expenditure, based mostly on activity, 
financed by social contributions, a high level of labour protection (Germany, France, 
Belgium, Austria). 
- The Mediterranean model with an intermediate level of social expenditure based on 
activity, financed by social contributions, a low level of family and unemployment 
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benefits offset by family solidarity, low female participation rates, and a high level of 
labour protection (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal).  
- The Liberal model with low level of social expenditure, based on citizenship, targeting the 
poorer, and with a low level of labour protection (Ireland and also the UK). 
Replacement ratios derived from unemployment benefits are high in most euro area countries, 
at the exception of Mediterranean ones (Spain, Greece, Italy), where unemployment rates are 
not particularly low. Employment protection is strong in continental and Mediterranean 
countries, as compared to liberal and some Scandinavian countries (according to the OECD 
employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator, see table 10).  
10. Employment protection indicators 
 Social protection public 
expenditures, % of GDP
Net replacement rate 
2004 
EPL,  
2003 
Belgium 30.1 66 2.5 
Germany 30.2 75 2.5 
Greece 23.8 33 2.9 
Spain 22.1 52 3.1 
France 33.4 71 2.9 
Ireland 20.1 71 1.3 
Italy 20.9 6 2.4 
Netherlands 24.8 79 2.3 
Austria 29.7 73 2.2 
Portugal 27.8 72 3.5 
Finland 29.4 75 2.1 
Sweden 36.7 77 2.6 
UK 26.3 66 1.1 
Denmark 34.3 77 1.8 
Japan 21.1 66 1.8 
US n.a. 29 0.7 
Source: OECD. 
 
Table 11 summarises economic disparities in the euro area in 2005. Until recently, European 
authorities have been focusing on public finance imbalances. But the weakness of GDP 
growth in Italy and Germany, the persistence of high unemployment rates in several euro area 
countries, competitiveness losses in southern economies as reflected in rising current account 
imbalances is more worrying for the euro area as a whole.  
11. Disparities in the euro area 
GDP growth,  
% 
Unemployment 
rates, 
 % 
Inflation,  
% 
Current account 
balance,  
% of GDP 
Government 
balance,  
% of GDP 
> 3 :  
Ireland, Greece, 
Spain 
< 5 : 
Ireland, Neths. 
< 2 :  
Germany, Finland, 
France, Austria 
>3: 
Neths, Germany 
> 0 :  
Finland, Spain, 
Ireland 
< 2 :  
Italy, Germany, 
Portugal, Neths.  
> 8 : 
Greece, Germany, 
France, Spain, 
Belgium, Finland 
> 3 :  
Spain, Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal 
<–5% : 
Spain, Portugal, 
Greece.  
< – 2 :  
Portugal, Greece, 
Italy, Germany, 
France 
Source: European Commission. 
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Table 12 summarises the economic situation of EU-15 countries using a global index of 
imbalances. The index is arbitrary and must be interpreted with caution. Some countries have 
no major macroeconomic problem (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Austria and 
Ireland). Some countries suffer mainly from insufficient GDP growth (Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium and Portugal). Some countries have mainly current account deficits problems 
(Spain, UK, Greece and Portugal). The smaller countries seem to have performed better than 
the bigger ones, older countries better than catching up ones, outside the euro area better than 
euro area countries. The Scandinavian model exhibits the best performance; the 
Mediterranean model the poorer one (see table 13). 
12. Economic performance disparities in the EU-15 
  Index* 
Germany  Continental, Big, Old -3.0 
France Continental, Big, Old -4.0 
Italy Mediterranean, Big, Old -5.3 
Spain Mediterranean, Medium, Catching-up -3.3 
Netherlands Scandinavian, Medium, old 4.2 
Belgium Continental, Small, old -0.2 
Austria Continental, Small, old 3.8 
Greece Mediterranean, Small, Catching up -6.3 
Portugal Continental, Small, Catching up -7.2 
Ireland Liberal, Small, Catching up 5.1 
Finland Scandinavian, Small, Old 4.3 
Denmark Scandinavian, Small, Old 5.5 
Sweden Scandinavian, Small, Old 5.1 
UK Liberal, Big, Old 1.4 
US Liberal, Big, Old -1.8 
* The index is calculated as: 2 g-i-(ur-5)+0.5(sb+eb), using 1999-2005 data for GDP growth (g) and IPCH inflation (i); 2005 
data for unemployment rate (ur), public (sb) and current account (eb) balances. 
Source: European Commission, authors’ estimates. 
13. Disequilibrium index* 
Big country -2.5 Small country 1.3 
In the euro area -1.1 Outside the euro area 2.6 
Old 0.9 Catching up -3.0 
Scandinavian 4.8 Continental -0.9 Mediterr. -5.5 Liberal. 1.6 
*Unweighted averages 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
3. How to explain disparities in the euro area?  
Since 1999, a number of disparities and imbalances countries have remained or increased in 
the euro area. This is due to an economic framework which was not built to handle diverse 
and persistent structural disparities. Catching-up countries have benefited from low real 
interest rates. The absence of economic policy coordination is harmful especially for larger 
economies albeit allowing the smaller economies to take advantage of it. Economic policy 
does no more aim at supporting growth but at inducing structural reforms. Last, continental 
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countries are not prepared to address globalisation, having chosen neither a liberal strategy 
nor a Scandinavian one.  
The advantages of being a catching-up country 
Catching-up countries have benefited from significant falls in their nominal interest rates from 
1992 to 1999. Real interest rates adjusted from growth fell by 10 points in Greece, 6.5 in 
Spain and 4 in Ireland (see table 3). At the same time, the exchange change risk disappeared. 
Households and company investment was boosted by interest rates. This raised output and 
inflation, lowering further real interest rates adjusted from growth (Deroose et al. 2004). 
Domestic output cannot be stabilised through the euro area monetary policy. Losses in 
competitiveness are the only stabilising factor although it takes time to play. The rise in 
external deficits can be easily financed by the European banking system. Growth in catching-
up countries has not decelerated despite rising external deficits because domestic demand 
robustness did more than offset competitiveness losses. The persistence of external deficits 
induces a progressive deterioration of households and firms debt ratios, which could initiate a 
financial crisis. But this risk is minor due to the low level of real interest rates. The rise in 
foreign borrowing does not lead to financial markets prudence, because borrowing is in euros 
and hence there is no exchange risk. The relatively small size of catching-up countries means 
that domestic inflation, domestic credit and external deficits do not generate tensions at the 
euro area level and can be accepted by other euro area countries. Catching-up countries have 
therefore a strong advantage in being in the euro area. 
If they wanted to restore their competitiveness, they would need to run restrictive fiscal 
policies – but European authorities cannot request such a policy from them because robust 
GDP growth allows for a fiscal surplus, like in Spain – or restrictive wage policies, difficult to 
implement under robust output growth. Restrictive fiscal and wage policies would negatively 
affect peer countries so the latter do not exert pressure for such policies to be implemented. 
Hence imbalances can grow and persist for a long time. The bubble burst in Portugal in 2001, 
but has not yet in Spain or Greece. The two latter countries still seemed to be in a favourable 
situation in 2006.  
 
Weaknesses in the euro area economic policy framework 
The euro area economic policy framework is based on three pillars. First, the single monetary 
policy aims at price stability. Second, domestic fiscal policies are under the surveillance of 
European procedures requesting medium-term budgetary positions in balance, allowing only 
economic stabilizers to play and no discretionary policy. Third, a European strategy of 
structural and liberal reforms expected to raise medium-term growth, although this strategy is 
hardly implemented at the domestic level (Fitoussi/Le Cacheux, 2004, Mathieu/Sterdyniak, 
2003, 2006). No common short-term stabilisation policy is implemented at the area level. 
Specific country situations are not taken into account, in the absence of domestic inflation or 
external deficits criteria, GDP growth and employment targets and with single public finance 
targets. Last, there is no consensus in the EU on a macroeconomic strategy: some countries 
would favour a growth strategy supported by demand, while the Commission and other 
countries prone a strategy based on structural reforms. 
On the contrary, a global macroeconomic strategy should set out ambitious growth targets for 
each country, should keep interest rates low, should try to maintain a relatively low exchange 
rate level and should let each country implement the fiscal policy needed to reach the desired 
level of output. Contractionary fiscal policies should be requested only in countries running 
excessive inflation (accounting for the Balassa-Samuelson effect), excessive external deficits 
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or credit growth. Countries running excessive external deficits should implement wage 
moderation policies in order to restore their competitiveness, but this should be accompanied 
by interest rate cuts or wage increases or more expansionary fiscal policies in partner 
countries. In this framework, excessive inflation would signal specific supply problems in 
countries having robust demand. These countries could then fight these tensions without 
fearing insufficient demand. The needed reforms would become clear once tensions have 
actually emerged: insufficient capital stock, shortage of skilled labour in specific sectors. The 
experience shows that imbalances resulting from excessive labour demand can easily be 
tackled either through raising skills, labour market participation or immigration.  
It is over-supply which is difficult to tackle. Structural reforms are much more difficult to 
implement when demand is too low. When there are few job offers, it is difficult to find 
incentives to bring inactive people to work; it is difficult to train the unemployed for jobs that 
do not exist; the weakness of investment reduces labour productivity growth; it is difficult to 
reorganise the productive structure when laid-off people will not easily find a new job; 
structural reforms increase economic uncertainty, therefore the savings rate, which dampens 
demand further. Public deficits must then support demand and this increases uncertainty. 
Output growth is then constrained by the weaknesses of both demand and supply.  
According to this point of view, national governments do not have rooms for manoeuvre to 
support growth, while the policy framework weaknesses maintain a low growth in the euro 
area. But this view does not explain why some countries performed better than others. 
 
Non-cooperative national policies 
In the absence of economic policy co-ordination, countries use the tools at their disposal. 
Fiscal policy remains effective but in an area with many countries, each country may be 
reluctant to use the fiscal tool: the positive effects on output will be shared with trade partners 
and in the end will be relatively weak for the initiating country. Fiscal policy is relatively 
effective in large countries and conversely restrictive fiscal policy is particularly costly. Large 
countries may also use their political weight to oppose the Commission’s requests on 
reducing their domestic fiscal autonomy. Fiscal policy is less powerful in smaller countries. 
These countries also have less political weight in face of the Commission. 
On the contrary, smaller countries can be tempted to improve their competitiveness through 
wage moderation, because the negative impact on domestic demand will be more than offset 
by external demand gains. Such strategies are more painful for larger countries. Besides, 
concerted wage negotiations between social partners are more common in smaller than in 
larger countries, which facilitates the implementation of wage moderation policies. Smaller 
economies may also more easily introduce tax competition policies because the gains from 
attracting foreign companies will exceed the revenues losses on the national tax base.  
If countries act independently, the outcome will a non-optimal Nash equilibrium with too 
restrictive wage and fiscal policies. There is too much competition and not enough 
cooperation in the area. This coordination default is harmful for the area as a whole, more for 
larger economies than for smaller ones (Le Cacheux, 2004).  
Moreover, all countries are not in a similar situation. Some countries (the Netherlands, 
Austria and Scandinavian countries) have a long tradition of wage agreements which may 
help to answer demand or supply shocks. But this is not the case in other countries, like in 
Italy. Italy can no more depreciate its currency to counter the effects of the emergence of 
China and other Asian competitors. Fixed exchange rates and rigid inflation rates induce 
persistent periods of low growth in some countries, while other countries can react faster, 
either because of their smaller size or of more rapid wage answers.  
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Non cooperative strategies can be implemented and be successful at the national level, 
especially in smaller countries. The bigger euro area economies initially opposed such 
strategies but had later to follow, like Germany since 2001, which depresses demand in the 
euro area and strengthens the search for competitiveness gains. 
In practice, the larger countries have run relatively expansionary fiscal policies (Germany, 
France, Italy), and also Portugal and Greece. From 1998 to 2005, restrictive wage policies 
have been implemented in large countries (Germany), medium-size countries (Spain), and 
smaller economies (Austria, Greece). Two smaller economies (Finland, Austria) have cut 
their tax-to-GDP ratios by the larger extent. 
Large countries may be tempted to modify the functioning of their labour market, either by 
centralising wage negotiations, or by promoting wage and labour flexibility. But, there is no 
evidence that labour market flexibility alone can keep an economy close to full employment, 
in the absence of active macroeconomic policies (see the US example), or without benefiting 
from competitiveness gains, like in the smaller European economies.  
Large countries (Germany, France, Italy) account for 65% of the euro area population (71% 
with Greece and Portugal). They could thus try to impose their strategy. However, they have 
never firmly taken a common position. For instance, in the SGP reform debate in 2005, they 
have not imposed that capital expenditures should be deducted from public deficits in the 
assessment of the 3% of GDP threshold. Is this a sacrifice in favour of European 
construction? Or is this a strategic choice of domestic authorities in order to implement at 
home unpopular structural reforms in the name of Europe?  
 
The crisis of the European Social Model  
Tensions are exacerbated by the difficulties faced by ‘the European Social Model’ in a global 
world. The continental Europe model appears less efficient vis-à-vis globalisation than the 
Anglo-Saxon model or the Scandinavian one (Sapir, 2005, Aiginger, 2006).  
Continental Europe countries traditionally shared specificities in terms of the role of the State 
in the economy, industrial policies, relationships between firms, banks and the State, firms’ 
financing, financial markets. These specificities have been implicitly given up in the context 
of financial globalisation and European construction, but a new coherent framework remains 
to be settled. For example, who controls large companies if the State or banks are no more 
involved? In theory, it should be financial markets, but what happens if they do not play this 
role? The withdrawal of the State or the banks in the economy leaves an empty space which 
may be detrimental to companies’ governance and innovating capacities. 
Globalisation places continental Europe workers in competition with NMS and Asian 
workers. What strategy does Europe wish to implement in face of industrial job losses? Can 
Europe choose a two-pillar strategy: on one hand subsidizing higher education, R&D in order 
to help the expansion of innovative and high value-added sectors; on the other hand, 
subsidizing a lower-productivity sector of services to the persons? Can this be achieved 
without a dramatic rise in inequalities? Does Europe wish the winners of globalisation to 
compensate for the losses for the losers (but this requires that the winners agree or are 
constrained to pay, more national solidarity or more tax harmonization, two strategies which 
Europe does currently oppose)? Could the Scandinavian strategy, combining efforts on 
innovation and on re-qualification and social support of the unemployed, be applied in more 
open, heterogeneous and large countries? 
The Continental Europe model must be adapted, but this raises conflicts of interest between 
social classes. This implies economic and social choices. European authorities do not help in 
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the process, for instance when they restrict State aids to firms, imposing reforms expected to 
foster competition, prohibit fights against tax avoidance,…  
European dominant classes have not tried to protect the European Social Model. They took 
the opportunity of globalisation and of the single market to impose structural reforms in 
Europe, in particular public and welfare expenditures cuts and labour market flexibility. In 
their view, active macroeconomic policies cannot support output growth: people should 
understand that the only choice is to accept a liberal functioning of the economy or see capital 
flow towards more friendly skies. This is the famous TINA (There is no alternative strategy) 
of Margaret Thatcher. Without any macroeconomic and social long run coherent strategy, 
Continental countries are the losers of the European construction in a global world. 
4. What policy answers? 
The euro area as a whole suffers from insufficient growth and seems unable to cut mass 
unemployment. This is true especially for five countries accounting for 72% of the area: 
Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and Portugal. Six countries are however in a better position: 
Spain, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, although two of them run large external 
deficits. The euro area economic strategy should thus aim at increasing the output level and at 
reducing imbalances while accounting for disparities.  
 
a) A market oriented view 
For many economists and for the Commission (Tilford, 2006, for instance, or Deroose et al., 
2004), increasing flexibility in all markets will reduce disparities in Europe. The EU has been 
unable to organize a satisfactory coordination of economic policies. Instead of trying to 
improve the framework, the mainstream view refers to a Walrasian myth: if each economy 
was fully flexible (prices, wages, workers), there would be no need for economic policy and 
so no coordination problem. But the US example shows that this is an illusion: economic 
policy is needed even in a flexible economy.  
More flexible labour markets are not the panacea. Contrary to today’s mainstream opinion, 
wage flexibility is not the answer to demand or supply shocks because it increases uncertainty 
and demand weakness.  
International labour mobility should not be an objective in Europe. Governments cannot say 
to the unemployed: “Please go and find a job abroad”. The EMU should allow each country to 
grow, without having requesting people to emigrate (or even leave their region) to find a job.  
Under liberal strategies, the European social model necessarily moves towards the Anglo-
Saxon one. In the absence of tax harmonisation, MS will have no choice but cut strongly 
public expenditure and redistribution. If firms are allowed to earn profits in Germany and pay 
(reduced) taxes in Switzerland, who will pay for public infrastructure in Germany? If firms 
can chose to pay for workers’ insurance in a private insurance company, who will pay for the 
poor? Continental European countries are supposed to have no choice but accept rising 
inequalities. 
 
b) The Lisbon strategy  
The European Commission does not recommend an entirely liberal strategy, but a mix of 
sound macroeconomic policies, higher market flexibility, social protection reforms in order to 
raise employment, public support for innovation and move towards a knowledge society. This 
strategy is embedded in the Lisbon Agenda and raises implementation and content issues.  
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The Lisbon strategy was from the beginning a technocratic project, without democratic 
debate, without mobilization of the European opinion, involvement of the civil society and 
social partners. The strategy did not account for country differences, necessary trade-offs 
between objectives, and differences of view among social forces. The majority of the 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda are related to research, innovation, higher education and 
have little impact for the majority of people. Short-term issues have been neglected. Last, the 
Lisbon Agenda raises the political issue of who should manage the reform process: the 
Commission, national governments, national parliaments, social partners, or the public 
opinion? 
A sound macroeconomic strategy?  
We will consider here the latest version of the Lisbon Agenda, adopted in July 2005: the 24 
integrated guidelines for growth and jobs (2005-08). 
6 macroeconomic guidelines recall the need for sound macroeconomic policies to support 
growth. Guidelines 1 and 6 repeat that countries must have medium-term budgetary positions 
in balance. Countries running deficits should cut their structural deficits by at least of 0.5 
percentage point per year, whatever the cyclical situation. The link between the single 
monetary policy and national fiscal policies is not considered. Guideline 2 asks Member 
States to address the issue of ageing population by reducing public debt (but population 
ageing involves a rise in the savings rate, therefore the demand for public bonds), to reform 
their pensions and health systems (but how?) and finally to raise employment rates. But the 
strong growth strategy needed to reach these aims is not organised.  
Guideline 3 requests public expenditure to be reallocated towards research, infrastructure and 
education. However the needed cuts in current expenditure are not specified. Guideline 4 
requests that Member States introduce structural reforms to facilitate the implementation of 
sound macroeconomic policies. But one could prefer that coordinated expansionary 
macroeconomic policies are implemented first in order to facilitate the implementation of 
structural reforms.  
Microeconomic strategy: competition and innovation…   
The core objective is to raise productivity and innovation in Europe. EU-15 GDP per capita 
has remained at 72% of US GDP per capita since 1973. This is more primarily due to 
differences in employment rate, unemployment rate and annual worked hours rather to 
productivity per head. But labour productivity per hour growth has kept on decelerating in the 
EU-15 (1.0% per year) since 1995 whereas it has accelerated in the US (2.2% per year). 
Innovations reducing the need for labour are hardly welcome in a mass unemployment 
situation.  
The lessons of the burst of the NICT bubble and the collapse in equity prices are still to be 
drawn. Growth through innovation (guideline 8), ICT (guideline 9), development and 
liberalisation of financial markets remains the dogma. Guideline 10 recommends 
strengthening the ‘competitive advantages of the industrial base’. But this would require a 
major change with the competition policy of the Commission, which aims at reducing state 
aid.  
Guideline 11 considers environmental issues, but contradictions between growth and 
environment are not highlighted. Guideline 12 recommends deepening the Internal Market. 
Here too, contradictions are not accounted for: should the energy sector and collective 
transportation system be privatised without considering long-term and regional planning 
issues? The questions raised by the Bolkestein Directive are not addressed: how companies 
with different social standards should compete? Guideline 13 calls for open and competitive 
markets; asks for the reduction of State aid which distorts competition, while recognising the 
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need for addressing market deficiencies, helping research, innovation, education. Guideline 
14 calls for reducing regulations as if they were necessarily harmful. For example, should 
consumer protection be given up? Guideline 15 asks for fostering entrepreneurship, for 
instance by ‘a tax system that rewards success’, which questions tax progressiveness. 
What employment strategy? The myth of flexibility 
The general objective remains to increase labour force availability and quality. But no 
suggestion is made on how to increase job offers. Guideline 17 reaffirms ambitious objectives 
for employment rates (in 2010, 70% for overall population, 60% for women, 50% for older 
workers). Guideline 18 suggests increasing labour demand by lowering youth unemployment, 
giving women and older people incentives to work. Guideline 19 recommends increasing 
work incentives. But the call for modernising social protection systems is worrying, if the 
point is to reduce early retirement, cut pensions or unemployment benefits while job 
opportunities for older workers are not there yet. 
Guideline 20 proposes to remove obstacles to labour mobility, but sensitive issues are not 
addressed: how to prevent workers from central and eastern European countries from exerting 
downward pressure on wages in the West? Guideline 21 recommends increasing flexibility 
(albeit reconciling it with job security), anticipating better future changes and facilitating 
transitions. But what strategy should be implemented? Should it be Anglo-Saxon or 
Scandinavian?  
Guideline 22 proposes to ensure that wages grow in line with productivity and that non-wage 
costs are cut, especially for the low-paid. Wages tend to grow already less rapidly than labour 
productivity in the euro area: the wage share in value added dropped from 67.4% in 2000 to 
66.2% in 2005. Social contributions cuts cannot imply benefits cuts (what would be the 
advantage for workers and jobs to cut health contributions if this meant they would have to 
pay for private insurance?). Other resources should be found.  
The integrated guidelines forget several things 
The integrated guidelines forget that Europe suffers from insufficient demand which partly 
results from the European framework. They do not try to make the SGP consistent with the 
Lisbon agenda, accounting for investment expenditure and more generally expenditure for the 
future, in the assessment of domestic fiscal policies. Monetary policy and more especially 
exchange rate policies are not considered. Can the euro area remain competitive after a 40% 
rise in the euro vis-à-vis the dollar? The guidelines do not consider social Europe. How to 
reconcile freedom of movement and establishment with domestic tax autonomy? How to 
avoid a ‘race-to-the bottom’ tax competition? How to avoid a rising gap between the winners 
of globalisation refusing to contribute to national solidarity and the poorer? The guidelines do 
not consider industrial policy. Are competition policy and cuts in state aid sufficient? Should 
European champions and innovative sectors be supported? What policy answers in face of 
delocalisation? 
 
c) Less Europe? The re-nationalisation of economic policies 
The re-nationalisation strategy would consist in giving again national governments room for 
manoeuvre to implement specific economic strategies. Each country could thus take care of 
solving their specific imbalances in their own way. The European economic policy 
framework would be re-examined with a view to leave more autonomy to Member States. 
The latter would be allowed to implement domestic industrial policies, to protect their tax 
revenues through measures fighting tax avoidance, to choose their social model, etc. 
Governments (and the Peoples) would be clearly responsible for their choices.    
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However, euro area MS would continue to share common monetary policy, interest rate and 
exchange rate. A code of good conduct would still need to be defined in order to avoid 
excessive inflation rates or external deficits. The countries would thus not be able to choose 
their policy mix. It would be difficult to re-nationalise the external trade policy. The prospect 
of future tax or social harmonisation would vanish. Re-nationalisation would increase the risk 
of implementation of non-cooperative strategies and of social and tax dumping. The countries 
would have no choice but move towards the liberal model. Europe would give up the 
ambition of offering a specific model.  
 
d) More Europe? 
European countries have no other choice but design a new economic policy framework, at 
least for the euro area, if not for the EU-27. This framework must, at the same time, match 
democratic principles and account for diverse national situations.  
A first option would be for economic policy to be decided at the area level. But Europe is not 
a nation: political, economic and social lives are not unified. Institutions, taxation and social 
protection systems differ. Economic circumstances themselves remain different. Some 
convergence would be necessary, but there are three models in Europe: liberal, Scandinavian, 
continental. Towards which model should Europe converge? There is no consensus on 
economic policies, reforms, strategies or institutions in the euro area. Choices can only result 
from a democratic process. But European peoples would probably not agree on an economic, 
political and social unification decided at the European level. It is difficult to imagine a 
single framework able to manage all different national situations. However, this is the case 
for monetary policy. But monetary policy only sets a single interest rate and we have seen 
that the outcome is not optimal. A European fiscal policy would have to set many tax rates, 
public expenditure levels, etc., which seems impossible. 
European governance will need to be based on national policies coordination. The euro area 
seems more appropriate for such a co-ordination than the EU-27 because it covers more 
homogenous economies. But this requests that Member States agree to share a common 
“European social model” that will need to be defined, protected, and able to evolve.  
However, the economic policy to be implemented remains a difficult issue (see, also, 
Huffschmid, 2006) and will have to combine Keynes, Colbert and social democracy. 
In a mass-unemployment situation, the euro area needs a growth-oriented policy. It would be 
desirable to set up actual economic policy coordination in the framework of the Eurogroup, 
with whom the ECB would have to dialogue. This co-ordination should not focus on public 
finance balances, but should aim at supporting economic activity and achieving a 3% annual 
growth target. The process will have to account for the needs for growth in each country and 
also for their competitiveness, external balance and inflation rate. Intra-zone disparities 
should be accounted for: catching-up countries could run higher inflation, high saving rates 
countries could be entitled to higher public deficits, some countries should be asked to raise 
taxes in order to avoid over accumulating private debt, a depreciation of the euro could be 
preferred to national competitive policies,…This is not an easy task.  
Europe should try to design a specific model of European firms, caring about jobs, regional 
activity and sustainable growth. Companies have a social role to play. They should care about 
not only their shareholders but also their employees and customers. This means that Member 
States should maintain a relatively high level of company taxation to give companies 
incentives to: build homogeneous infrastructure in the country, subsidise firms locating their 
production in areas in difficulty, supporting economic sectors in difficulty and subsidising 
R&D. Member States should have an active industrial policy, aiming both at developing 
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Large European Companies and innovating SME’s, Research centres and companies 
networks. This would require the adoption of a common strategy in Europe. European 
authorities should plan their future productive activities and industrial employment in Europe; 
reduce the weight of competition policy and promote a European industrial policy in the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy. This common strategy should be implemented mainly by 
Member States and not by European authorities. Co-operation in R&D and higher education 
areas should be developed. But Member States are not ready to give up their prerogatives 
because it is not similar for them that education or research centres develop in their countries 
or abroad. Community rules need to be modified, so that domestic aid can support specific 
sectors.  
The objective should be to maintain the European social model, characterized by a significant 
level of transfers, public expenditure and thus of taxation. Tax and social competition should 
be avoided. Some harmonisation will be needed to prevent unfair competition, through the 
introduction of minima taxation rates (corporate, wealth and higher incomes) and minima 
benefits (minimum income, minimum pension replacement ratio) and by tough measures 
against tax havens at a worldwide level. The European Social Model will have to rely on its 
comparative advantages (free education and health for all, good quality public infrastructure, 
efficient social security benefits) to remain competitive in a global world. A stronger GDP 
growth would lower unemployment rates and would allow the introduction of a “flex-security 
system” in Continental countries, with an adequate support of the unemployed (vocational 
training, training for new jobs). 
The improvement of the European economic framework is not only a technical issue; it 
requires a major change in the economic policy thinking, a new alliance between social 
classes concerned about full employment and social cohesion, the willingness to depart from 
financial markets and multinational companies’ points of view. A prerequisite would be that 
Member States populations agree on a European model but we are far from there. 
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